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Comments on Gibbs’ “Social nature of embodied cognition. 
A view from the world of metaphor”:  
Prerequisites for a social and cultural approach to cognition 
Caroline CANCE 
INTRODUCTION 
As suggested in the title of Gibbs’ paper, there is a need and a growing 
concern in cognitive science in general and in cognitive linguistics and 
psychology in particular, to take into account social and cultural aspects in 
investigating cognition. Moreover the collocation of social and nature is a nod 
to the traditional opposition between nature and culture in all human sciences. 
In his paper, Gibbs develops and promotes arguments in favor of social 
embodied cognition in the field of metaphor theory in cognitive linguistics. My 
goal here is to share some thoughts that arose from reading Gibb’s paper, by 
addressing some implications, consequences and prerequisites for cognitive 
(linguistics) research when one adopts such a social constructionist approach to 
cognition. I will give the point of view of a French researcher in cognitive 
linguistics and psychology, trained in cognitive science, experienced in 
pluridisciplinarity and applied research, and mostly interested in the 
relationships between perception, language and cognition through linguistic 
analysis of discourses about sensory experience. 
 
EMBODIED COGNITION: STILL A SCIENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL … AND 
THE UNIVERSAL? 
The notion of embodiment has garnered increased research attention in 
cognitive linguistics and cognitive science in the last two decades. The 
paradigm of embodied cognition distances itself from the predominant 
mentalist paradigm and is even seen by some as a key issue of the second 
“cognitive revolution” (Gibbs, this issue) or “second-generation cognitive 
science” (Sihna, 2007). To avoid the mentalist pitfall, a solution that has been 
proposed by some cognitive scientists is to (re-) ground cognitive processes in 
the bodily experience. Of course, it is important and constitutes without doubt 
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advancement in the field. Nevertheless, one of the first criticisms one can have 
about embodied cognition theory is that it focuses on the individual, as Gibbs 
states in his section “Some problems with traditional embodied conceptual 
metaphor theory”, where he stresses “the individual perspective on meta-
phorical thought and language”. Moreover, the individual perspective of 
embodied cognition remains generally at the level of a generic individual, a 
description level that is not so far from a certain kind of universalism. This is 
neither specific to the metaphor field nor to Gibbs’ works. It rather indicates 
some general naturalistic and reductionist positioning of cognitive linguistics 
and psychology within cognitive science.  
As Misra and Gergen remarked for psychology, “the prime concern of 
psychologists remained to make psychology a ‘science’ and science was 
identified with objectivity, experimentation, and universality” (Misra & 
Gergen, 1993: 227). This reduction to a generic and “universal” (Western) 
individual (body) has probably contributed to the “scientificity” and “object-
ivity” of cognitive research, allowing prescriptive formalisms. However, when 
attention is payed to social and cultural collective aspects of cognitive 
processes, this would have necessarily led to the identification of a diversity 
and complexity hardly “formalizable”. In this regard, Misra and Gergen add 
that “if considered at all - which was rare - culture was typically treated as 
source of error, to be controlled by sophisticated sampling procedures" or even 
infrequently converted into an independent (stimulus) variable” (Misra & 
Gergen, 1993: 227). 
Concerning linguistics, Rastier among others notices that “as cognitive 
research is concerned with only a small number of languages, studied 
synchronically and as the product of standard, that is, ideal speakers (….) the 
restriction of the object is accompanied by a change in the epistemological 
status of linguistics. From its position as a social science it moves into the 
purview of the nature sciences or of mathematics”. Furthermore, he suggests 
that “cognitive research as a whole would doubtless profit from a greater 
consideration of cultural factors” (Rastier, 2006, chap. 2).  
 
FROM INDIVIDUAL BODY TO (IDEALIZED) SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
INTERACTIONS 
Following Gibbs’ statement, one can fully agree that one of the main 
characteristics of human cognition – its social, cultural, and historical 
dimension – has been largely unexplored. In the field of cognitive science, 
scholars (mainly in anthropology, psychology, and linguistics) have already 
proposed several approaches of distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995), situated 
cognition (Suchman, 1987), grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2008), social 
cognition (Croft, 2009) or of an enactive approach to cognition (Varela et al, 
1991). Although these approaches differ from one another, they all claim a 
dynamic character of cognition and stress that it must be considered as relying 
on and resulting from situated interactions between the agent(s) and their 
environment(s) (see Sinha, 2007, for a discussion and review). In psychology, 
Barsalou’s theory of grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2008) considers 
“simulation, situated action, social interaction, interaction with the 
environment, and bodily states as dynamically underlying cognition”, renewing 
traditions in psychology (phenomenology, Gestalt) anterior to behaviorist and 
cognitivist approaches (Sihna, 2007). In linguistics, Croft remarks the 
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incompletion of cognitive linguistics, being “too solipsistic” and recommends 
cognitive linguistics to “go ‘outside the head’ and incorporate a social-
interactional perspective on the nature of language” (Croft, 2009: 395).   
UN-SITUATED AND A-CULTURED STUDIES ABOUT SOCIAL COGNITION 
Interestingly, this socio-cultural and situated perspective has received 
increased research attention over the past two decades, but some questions 
remain unanswered especially on the methodological changes it should 
involve. In the different experiments in social psychology and psycho-
linguistics that Gibbs reports in his paper (from p. 7) but also more generally in 
the field, one can easily notice that there is no explicit mention of the linguistic 
and cultural context where the experiments take place, except when the 
experiments dealt precisely with contrasting different cultures (p. 9). In the 
material and methods section of these publications some information about 
subjects can be found. For instance, one can learn that the social experiments 
on the spatial (vertical) localization of GOOD and BAD experiences (Schubert, 
2005) were conducted with Dutch students. However, why is this not explicitly 
mentioned in the discussion? How and to what extent can these specific local 
results be generalized to all human beings, instead of situating the experiment 
and its conclusions in its particular social, cultural and linguistic context? On 
this point, it is rather informative to read Giessner & Schubert’s own 
commentaries (2007) about the limitations of their experiment on power and 
social status bodily based along a vertical dimension. They first recognize that 
“all studies relied on student samples” although they add that “there is no 
reason to expect students to behave differently from other populations” 
(Giessner & Schubert, 2007: 43). They also remark that their work “mainly 
focused on showing that information on a vertical dimension in space can 
influence power judgments and vice versa (…) [and that they] used very 
artificial studies with manipulations focused to show this relation. Thus,  it 
might be premature to conclude from these studies that these effects translate 
into natural context” (Giessner & Schubert, 2007: 43). Further comments on 
this aspect will be made in the section dedicated to ecological validity, but I 
already want to stress that one of the conditions to incorporate a social-
interactional perspective in studying cognition is precisely to situate the 
experiments in “natural” (everyday-life) context.  
Considering what parts of the studies are not mentioned as “limitations” is 
also very informative. Although Giessner & Schubert’s studies have been done 
with Dutch (and German) students, no comment is made on the possible 
cultural and language effects on conceptualization. Would the same results be 
found on the links between for instance a vertical dimension and the 
BAD/GOOD conceptualizations if other, non-Western, cultures were 
investigated? Similarly, it would be interesting to verify if non-Western 
cultures all necessarily conceptualize spiritual experience along a vertical 
dimension (Meier et al, 2007, cited in Gibbs, this issue). Along the same line, 
one can debate the first example Gibbs gives in his paper, that is the metaphor 
of SEEING AS KNOWING. Its universality is hardly questioned, which might be 
because it is so obvious for our Western minds (eyes!). Nevertheless cross-
cultural studies have shown that some cultures (e.g. in Australia) do not 
necessarily share this visual metaphor for knowledge and rather have an 
auditory one: KNOWING AS HEARING (Evans and Wilkins, 1998).  
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A WESTERN FRAME OF REFERENCE 
These last considerations lead to a second issue that has to be stressed: 
scientists’ Western frame of reference orients the conceptualization of research 
and experimental design. As Misra and Gergen point out, contemporary cross-
cultural psychology is a Western construction. It intends to study culture 
objectively “treating culture as a composite of research variables” (Misra & 
Gergen, 1993: 228) without making explicit distinction between etic 
(universal) and emic (culturally specific) dimensions. As they remark, “cross-
cultural psychology has generally remained within the assumptive networks of 
mainstream psychology. It has maintained the methodological posture, the 
focus on variables or dimensions, the preference for experimentation and 
statistical analysis, and the mechanistic view of human functioning as inserted 
between stimuli and responses (…) and so long as culture is reduced to a set of 
moderating variables or dimensions, it will suffer the same fate” (ibid., p.229). 
From Misra and Gergen’s perspective, breaking the deadlock relies on the 
development of an “ethnophenomenology” in which knowing other cultures 
means “immersing oneself in that culture's worldview in order to observe in 
oneself the effect of such an immersion” (Kukla, 1988: 151, quoted by Misra 
& Gergen, 1993). Nearly 20 years after, it seems that this ethnophenomenology 
is still missing in cross-cultural psychology and would be of great help to 
consider cultural aspects of cognition. These issues are very familiar to 
anthropologists, social scientists and field linguists and cognitive linguistics 
and psychology could probably benefit considerably from their insights and 
collaborations. 
SITUATING COGNITIVE RESEARCH INTO CULTURES AND HISTORY 
After a few decades of research focused on identification of universals in 
language and cognition (with the paradigmatic work of Berlin and Kay, 1969, 
as a reference point), an increasing body of literature focuses on the 
relationships between language, cognition and perception in various cultures. 
There is converging evidence that these relationships are (at least partly) 
cultural co-constructions (see, among others, Boroditsky, 2010, Evans & 
Levinson, 2009, Majid & Levinson (eds.), 2011, Roberson et al 2005, 
Wierzbicka, 2008 for cross cultural studies and Dubois & Cance, to appear, for 
variations within the French culture and language). The study of conceptual 
metaphors will certainly benefit from opening itself to cross cultural studies as 
most research has been conducted on Indo-European languages so far 
(Kovesces, 2006). In his paper, Gibbs refers to Kovesces’ synthesis of cross-
cultural studies about universality of anger. The interest of this work lies in its 
attempt to compare different Western with non-Western cultures (e.g. English, 
Hungarian, Chinese and Japanese) in their conceptualization of embodied 
metaphors of anger, and also in its attempt to pay attention to the diachronic 
dimension of these conceptualizations (Kovesces, 2000). This diachronic 
dimension is another crucial aspect that is mostly missing in the field, i.e. the 
grounding into (individual and collective) history. On that particular point, 
Pastoureau’s exemplary work on the history of colors (primarily in France) 
shows how diachronic variation is at work as soon as the investigation is 
situated into history and social and cultural practices (Pastoureau, 2008). For 
instance, the symbolic values of black and white (noir and blanc) are shown to 
be ambivalent and to have changed within ages, cultures, practices and 
domains of expertise. Black was very positively connoted in ancient Egypt, 
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and white is (still) the color of mourning in Eastern cultures. Thus the strong 
relationship between GOOD-WHITE / BAD-BLACK advocated by Meier et al 
(2004), Strobeck & Clore (2008), and reported by Gibbs (p. 8), might need to 
be reconsidered by situating their research in its specific cultural and historical 
context. 
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS: TOWARDS AN ECOLOGICAL 
VALIDITY FOR INVESTIGATING SITUATED COGNITION  
We have already seen that in embodied approaches to cognition and even in 
contemporary approaches that seek to account for social and cultural 
dimension of cognition, subjects are idealized and alone in an “aseptic” and 
decontextualized world. When results do not only come from “introspections 
and intuitions of individual analysts” (Gibbs, p.7), the construction of 
experimental settings can also play a role. In addition to the choice of subjects 
or groups of subjects mentioned above, the construction of the stimuli sets, 
tasks, and instructions can easily shape and contribute to some averaging and 
genericity (and eventually lead to universality). For instance, various scholars, 
from linguistics, anthropology or psychology, have deconstructed the Berlin & 
Kay’s experimental protocol, showing that it is strongly biased and therefore, 
not surprisingly, leads to the identification of universal basic color terms and 
concepts (see among others, Foley, 1997, Lucy, 1997, Dubois & Cance, 2009).  
In the 1950s, Gibson was already suggesting that psychologists leave their 
laboratories and start actively observing individuals interacting with their 
environment, in a quest for “an ecological approach to visual perception” 
(Gibson, 1979). More recently Rastier (2006) remarks, “there is a growing 
number of researchers engaged in cognitive research, notably in ergonomics 
and in anthropology (disciplines for which context is not a simple variable), 
who have argued for and adopted this very perspective (Suchman, 1987)”. In 
cognitive science, researchers have stressed the importance of such ecological 
validity, calling for an epistemology of experimental settings (Guastavino et al. 
2005, Guastavino, 2009, Cance, 2009). 
CONCLUSION 
Like Gibbs and a growing number of scholars in the cognitive science 
community, I aim to develop a situated approach to cognition. In this view, 
research on conceptual metaphors and more generally in cognitive linguistics 
and cognitive science needs to take into account not just the embodied 
experience but also to ground it into a cultural, social, historical (…) context. 
However, how to implement this approach remains an open question. 
Specifically, one of the challenging issues is certainly to describe and 
understand how these different levels are intertwined and rely on different 
kinds of individual and collective processes.  
As briefly presented, some scholars in cognitive linguistics and cognitive 
science have recently promoted social constructivist approaches. Nevertheless, 
the methodological implications still seem a bit vague. One might wonder how 
this shift is possible if current methodologies are (still) i) focusing, as we have 
seen, on the Western idealized speaker/individual (considered as generic and 
universal) and ii) performed in a lab setting, in abstraction of the cultural and 
social environment and context. It might be fruitful to (re-) connect with other 
fields, notably linguistics, that have decades of experience in dealing with 
social, cultural, and historical aspects of language and discourse processes 
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(sociolinguistics as linguistic typology, ethno-linguistics and discourse 
analysis) and where cognitive perspectives have already permeated their work. 
Among others, we can consider Paveau’s proposal of a linguistic discourse 
analysis that “prend pour objet la matérialité des discours produits, situés dans 
leurs contextes historique, social et culturel”, with a “une dimension cognitive 
(...) apte à enrichir et à peut-être renouveler des pratiques d’analyse qui 
commencent peut-être à épuiser leurs possibles” (Paveau, 2006: 11). Other 
works have defined and built on cognitive sociolinguistics (Geraert et al, 2010) 
and sociocognitive terminology (Temmerman, 2000). New practices are also 
developed in cognitive linguistics where methodologies of corpus analysis 
borrowed from sociolinguistics and discourse analysis start to be more 
systematically used (Glynn & Fischer, 2010). On the other hand, insights and 
methodologies from social psychology, sociology, anthropology - such as 
observations, ethnomethodology, and ethnographic methods - will also be very 
important to study individuals’ cognition situated into and interacting with a 
cultural and social environment (see for instance Mondada (ed.), 2005, on 
“espace, inter/action and cognition”). 
A strong pluridisciplinary framework is therefore needed to connect and 
structure the interactions between different fields such as sociology, 
anthropology, social psychology, cognitive psychology and cognitive 
linguistics (see Dubois (ed.), 2009, for a theoretical and methodological 
framework in linguistics and psychology). If the cognitive science community 
succeeds in doing so, this will allow for a “rehumanization” of the cognitive 
science landscape and emphasize the contribution of the humanities and social 
sciences to cognitive science. 
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